CVE List
| Id | CVE No. | Status | Description | Phase | Votes | Comments | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 554 | CVE-1999-0570 | Candidate | Windows NT is not using a password filter utility, e.g. PASSFILT.DLL. | Proposed (19990728) | ACCEPT(1) Northcutt | MODIFY(1) Frech | NOOP(2) Baker, Christey | REJECT(1) Wall | Northcutt> Here we are crossing into the best practices arena again. However since | passfilt does establish a measurable standard and since we aren"t the | ones defining the stanard, simply saying it should be employed I will | vote for this. | Frech> XF:nt-passfilt-not-inst(1308) | XF:nt-passfilt-not-found(1309) | Christey> Consider MSKB:Q161990 and MSKB:Q151082 | View |
| 106 | CVE-1999-0106 | Candidate | Finger redirection allows finger bombs. | Proposed (19990726) | ACCEPT(1) Northcutt | MODIFY(2) Frech, Shostack | RECAST(1) Baker | REVIEWING(1) Christey | Shostack> fingerd allows redirection | This is a larger modification, since there are two applications of the | vulnerability, one that I can finger anonymously, and the other that I | can finger bomb anonymously. | Frech> XF:finger-bomb | Christey> need more refs | Baker> This should be merged with 1999-0105 | View |
| 550 | CVE-1999-0565 | Candidate | A Sendmail alias allows input to be piped to a program. | Proposed (19990728) | ACCEPT(1) Northcutt | NOOP(1) Baker | RECAST(1) Shostack | REVIEWING(1) Christey | Shostack> Is this a default alias? Is my .procmailrc an instance of this? | Christey> It is not entirely clear whether the simple fact that an alias | pipes into a program should be considered a vulnerability. It | all depends on the behavior of that particular program. This | is one of a number of configuration-related issues from the | "draft" CVE that came from vulnerability scanners. In | general, when we get to general configuration and "policy," | it becomes more difficult to use the current CVE model to | represent them. So at the very least, this candidate (and | similar ones) should be given close consideration and | discussion before being added to the official CVE list. | | Because this candidate is related to general configuration | issues, and we have not completely determined how to handle | such issues in CVE, this candidate cannot be promoted to an | official CVE entry until such issues are resolved. | View |
| 239 | CVE-1999-0240 | Candidate | Some filters or firewalls allow fragmented SYN packets with IP reserved bits in violation of their implemented policy. | Proposed (19990728) | ACCEPT(1) Northcutt | NOOP(1) Baker | REJECT(1) Frech | Frech> Would reconsider if any references were available. | View |
| 552 | CVE-1999-0568 | Candidate | rpc.admind in Solaris is not running in a secure mode. | Proposed (19990728) | ACCEPT(1) Northcutt | NOOP(2) Baker, Christey | RECAST(2) Dik, Shostack | Shostack> are there secure modes? | Dik> Several: | 1) there is no "rpc.admind" daemon. | there used to be a "admind" RPC daemon (100087/10) | and there"s now an "sadmind" daemon (100232/10) | The switch over was somewhere around Solaris 2.4. | 2) Neither defaults to "secure mode" | 3) secure mode is "using secure RPC" which does | proper over the wire authentication by specifying | the "-S 2" option in inetd.conf | (security level 2) | Christey> XF:rpc-admind(626) | http://xforce.iss.net/static/626.php | MISC:http://pulhas.org/xploitsdb/mUNIXes/admind.html | View |
Page 743 of 20943, showing 5 records out of 104715 total, starting on record 3711, ending on 3715
