CVE List
| Id | CVE No. | Status | Description | Phase | Votes | Comments | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 540 | CVE-1999-0550 | Candidate | A router"s routing tables can be obtained from arbitrary hosts. | Proposed (19990726) | ACCEPT(1) Baker | MODIFY(1) Frech | RECAST(1) Northcutt | Northcutt> Don"t you mean obtained by arbitrary hosts | Frech> XF:routed | XF:decod-rip-entry | XF:rip | Baker> Concur with this as a security issue | View |
| 578 | CVE-1999-0596 | Candidate | A Windows NT log file has an inappropriate maximum size or retention period. | Proposed (19990728) | MODIFY(1) Frech | NOOP(1) Baker | REJECT(2) Northcutt, Wall | Northcutt> define appropriate | Frech> XF:reg-app-log-small(2521) | XF:reg-sec-log-maxsize(2577) | XF:reg-sys-log-small(2586) | View |
| 558 | CVE-1999-0576 | Candidate | A Windows NT system"s file audit policy does not log an event success or failure for security-critical files or directories. | Proposed (19990721) | ACCEPT(3) Baker, Shostack, Wall | MODIFY(2) Frech, Ozancin | REJECT(1) Northcutt | Northcutt> 1.) Too general are we ready to state what the security-critical files | and directories are | 2.) Does Ataris, Windows CE, PalmOS, Linux have such a capability | Ozancin> Some files and directories are clearly understood to be critical. Others are | unclear. We need to clarify that critical is. | Frech> XF:nt-object-audit | View |
| 529 | CVE-1999-0532 | Candidate | A DNS server allows zone transfers. | Proposed (19990726) | MODIFY(1) Frech | NOOP(1) Baker | REJECT(1) Northcutt | Northcutt> (With split DNS implementations this is quite appropriate) | Frech> XF:dns-zonexfer | View |
| 520 | CVE-1999-0523 | Candidate | ICMP echo (ping) is allowed from arbitrary hosts. | Proposed (19990726) | MODIFY(1) Meunier | NOOP(1) Baker | REJECT(2) Frech, Northcutt | Northcutt> (Though I sympathize with this one :) | CHANGE> [Frech changed vote from REVIEWING to REJECT] | Frech> Ping is a utility that can be run on demand; ICMP echo is a | message | type. As currently worded, this candidate seems as if an arbitrary | host | is vulnerable because it is capable of running an arbitrary program | or | function (in this case, ping/ICMP echo). There are many | programs/functions that | "shouldn"t" be on a computer, from a security admin"s perspective. | Even if this | were a vulnerability, it would be impacted by CD-HIGHCARD. | Meunier> Every ICMP message type presents a vulnerability or an | exposure, if access is not controlled. By that I mean not only those | in RFC 792, but also those in RFC 1256, 950, and more. I think that | the description should be changed to "ICMP messages are acted upon | without any access control". ICMP is an error and debugging protocol. | We complain about vendors leaving testing backdoors in their programs. | ICMP is the equivalent for TCP/IP. ICMP should be in the dog house, | unless you are trying to troubleshoot something. MTU discovery is | just a performance tweak -- it"s not necessary. I don"t know of any | ICMP message type that is necessary if the network is functional. | Limited logging of ICMP messages could be useful, but acting upon them | and allowing the modification of routing tables, the behavior of the | TCP/IP stack, etc... without any form of authentication is just crazy. | View |
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