CVE List
| Id | CVE No. | Status | Description | Phase | Votes | Comments | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 557 | CVE-1999-0575 | Candidate | A Windows NT system"s user audit policy does not log an event success or failure, e.g. for Logon and Logoff, File and Object Access, Use of User Rights, User and Group Management, Security Policy Changes, Restart, Shutdown, and System, and Process Tracking. | Proposed (19990721) | ACCEPT(4) Christey, Ozancin, Shostack, Wall | MODIFY(1) Frech | RECAST(2) Baker, Northcutt | Northcutt> It isn"t a great truth that you should enable all or the above, if you | do you potentially introduce a vulnerbility of filling up the file | system with stuff you will never look at. | Ozancin> It is far less interesting what a user does successfully that what they | attempt and fail at. | Christey> The list of event types is very useful for lookup. | Frech> XF:nt-system-audit | XF:nt-logon-audit | XF:nt-object-audit | XF:nt-privil-audit | XF:nt-process-audit | XF:nt-policy-audit | XF:nt-account-audit | CHANGE> [Baker changed vote from REVIEWING to RECAST] | View |
| 453 | CVE-1999-0454 | Candidate | A remote attacker can sometimes identify the operating system of a host based on how it reacts to some IP or ICMP packets, using a tool such as nmap or queso. | Proposed (19990728) | MODIFY(1) Frech | NOOP(2) Christey, Wall | REJECT(2) Baker, Northcutt | Northcutt> Nmap and queso are the tip of the iceberg and not the most advanced | ways to accomplish this. To pursue making the world signature free | is as much a vulnerability as having signatures, nay more. | Frech> XF:decod-nmap(2053) | XF:decod-queso(2048) | Christey> Add "fingerprinting" to facilitate search. | Some references: | MISC:http://www.insecure.org/nmap/nmap-fingerprinting-article.html | BUGTRAQ:19981228 A few more fingerprinting techniques - time and netmask | http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=91489155019895&w=2 | BUGTRAQ:19990222 Preventing remote OS detection | http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=91971553006937&w=2 | BUGTRAQ:20000901 ICMP Usage In Scanning v2.0 - Research Paper | http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=96791499611849&w=2 | BUGTRAQ:20000912 Using the Unused (Identifying OpenBSD, | http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=96879267724690&w=2 | BUGTRAQ:20000912 The DF Bit Playground (Identifying Sun Solaris & OpenBSD OSs) | http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=96879481129637&w=2 | BUGTRAQ:20000816 TOSing OSs out of the window / Fingerprinting Windows 2000 with | http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=96644121403569&w=2 | BUGTRAQ:20000609 p0f - passive os fingerprinting tool | http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=96062535628242&w=2 | Baker> I think we can probably reject this as the corollary is that you can identify OS from a IP/TCP packet sent by a system, looking at various parts of the SYN packet. Unless we believe that all systems should always use identical packet header/identical responses, in which case the protocol should not permit variation. | View |
| 573 | CVE-1999-0591 | Candidate | An event log in Windows NT has inappropriate access permissions. | Proposed (19990803) | ACCEPT(2) Baker, Wall | RECAST(1) Northcutt | Northcutt> splain Lucy, splain | View |
| 524 | CVE-1999-0527 | Candidate | The permissions for system-critical data in an anonymous FTP account are inappropriate. For example, the root directory is writeable by world, a real password file is obtainable, or executable commands such as "ls" can be overwritten. | Proposed (19990803) | ACCEPT(3) Baker, Northcutt, Wall | MODIFY(1) Frech | Northcutt> That that starts to get specific :) | Frech> ftp-writable-directory(6253) | ftp-write(53) | "writeable" in the description should be "writable." | View |
| 564 | CVE-1999-0582 | Candidate | A Windows NT account policy has inappropriate, security-critical settings for lockout, e.g. lockout duration, lockout after bad logon attempts, etc. | Proposed (19990721) | ACCEPT(3) Ozancin, Shostack, Wall | MODIFY(2) Baker, Frech | REJECT(1) Northcutt | Northcutt> The definition is? | Baker> Maybe a rewording of this one too. I think most people would agree on | some "minimum" policies like 3-5 bad attempts lockout for an hour or | until the administrator unlocks the account. | Suggested rewrite - | A Windows NT account policy does not enforce reasonable minimum | security-critical settings for lockouts, e.g. lockout duration, | lockout after bad logon attempts, etc. | Ozancin> with reservations | What is appropriate? | Frech> XF:nt-thres-lockout | XF:nt-lock-duration | XF:nt-lock-window | XF:nt-perm-lockout | XF:lockout-disabled | View |
Page 20920 of 20943, showing 5 records out of 104715 total, starting on record 104596, ending on 104600
